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convictions is not presumed to be prejudicial when for over a hundred
years, this same court in all other criminal cases has held such evidence
to be prejudicial and its introduction reversible error,1 unless it shows
intent or motive or is used to impeach the credibility of the defendant,
-when he takes the witness stand?21
Also, there is some feeling that statutes enhancing the punishment for
a second or subsequent offense impose a too severe punishment upon the
accused, and due to the fear of locked juries, many prosecutors are apt
to refrain from bringing indictments under such a statute. With the pro-
cedure herein set out, there is less likelihood of a disagreement among the
jurymen for that reason as they will have no knowledge of the indictment
under the Habitual Criminal Act until they have returned a verdict as to
the crime charged in the instant case.
In conclusion, it seems that the present status of criminal activity
demands the more frequent application of the Habitual Criminal Act, in
order to protect society from the continuous depredations of confirmed
criminals. Also, in order to give protection to a reformed criminal, the
procedure set forth herein seems more in line with such an objective.
S. E. M.
PARTY WALLS-WHAT CoNsTITuTEs A USE-UsE By LEssEE or NON-
BuiLDER-Plaintiff and defendant were adjoining landowners, and they
entered into an agreement whereby the defendant permitted the plaintiff
to "extend" a party wall eight inches in width on the defendant's side of
the property line, and whereby the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff
one-half of the value of said wall whenever the defendant, his successors
or assigns, desired to use the same. The agreement stipulated that the
defendant acquired "the right to use said wall-as a party wall." Plaintiff
erected the wall, and at the time of erection and continuously thereafter,
defendant's adjoining premises were in the possession of a tenant. This
tenant built a frame garage about twenty-four feet wide and twenty-four
feet long, supported by posts which rested on brick piers built on the
ground. The party wall formed one of the walls of the garage, and the
paper roofing of the garage was attached to the wall, this being, however,
the only point of connection between the garage and the wall. Plaintiff
contended that this was such a use as to make the defendant liable to
contribute one-half the value of the party wall. Trial was had by the
court, without a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant. Motion
for a new trial was filed and overruled. Plaintiff appealed. Held, that
construction of a garage so that a party wall formed one of its walls
attached to remainder of garage only by roofing paper is not such a use as
to render adjoining landowner liable for contribution under a party wall
agreement; and that the tenant's unauthorized use of a party wall could
-Dunn v. State (1903), 162 ind. 174, 70 N. E. 521; Pock v. State (1915), 185
Ind. 51, 110 N. E. 212; Redman v. State (1820), 1 Blackf. 96; Lovell v. State
(1859), 12 Ind. 18; Hahn v. State (1914), 182 Ind. 1, 105 N. E. 385.
-Cross v. State (1894), 138 Ind. 254, 37 N. E. 790; Spears v. State (1897),
147 Ind. 51, 46 N. E. 301; Thompson v. State (1919), 189 Ind. 182, 125 N. E. 641;
Zimmerman v. State (1920), 190 Ind. 537, 130 N. E. 235.
RECENT CASE NOTES
not impose on the landlord a duty of contributing half of the cost under
such an agreement.'
There are many courts which have held that under agreements or stat-
utes providing that the adjoining owner shall, on making use of a wall,
contribute to the builder toward the cost of its construction, the use con-
templated is the use to which a party wall is ordinarily put, namely, its use
in the construction and support of an adjoining building, including the
resting of timbers of the building on or in the wall; and in the absence of
other provisions, until such a use is made, no liability for contribution
arises. 2 In some instances, it has been said that a use which is slight or
temporary in its character will not make the user liable, that the utiliza-
tion intended is such as makes the wall a part of some permanent struc-
ture; as in Beggs v. Duling,3 where there was an open shed, ten feet high,
with the roof nailed to a two story party wall; and in Fox v. Mission Free
School,4 where a one story open shed was fastened onto a party wall.
There are some authorities, however, that hold as a qualification to the
above rules, that though a land owner is not liable to the owner of the
party wall for availing himself of such wall as part of an inclosure of his
premises,5 the use of the party wall as one of the inclosing walls of a
building erected on the adjoining lot is such a use as renders the adjoin-
ing owner liable for contribution,6 even though the building of which the
party wall constitutes one of the inclosures is not actually attached to, or
supported by the party wall.7 In most of the cases, the building of which
the party wall was one of the inclosing walls was of a fairly substantial
and permanent nature; however, in Moye v. Morrison,8 the court declared
that a use of the party wall as an inclosing wall for a one story shed, open
at the front, with one side wall of tin and one brick, supported by posts
set in stone and covered by roofing paper was such a use as to render the
user liable for contribution. One case also held that erection of a wooden
structure which would be unlawful under a city ordinance, except that the
party wall formed one .side, was such a use or benefit of the wall as
rendered the builder liable for his share of the party wall erection costs.9
.%Jones v. S. S. Fisher Realty Co. (1933), 187 N. E. 753.
2McEwen v. Nelson (1891), 40 Ill. App. 272; Berry v. Godfrey (1908), 198
Mass. 228, 84 N. E. 304; Fox v. Mission Free School (1894), 120 Mo. 349, 25 S. W.
172; Hunt v. Ambruster (1865), 115 N. J. Eq. 208; Kingsland V. Tucker (1889),
115 N. Y. 574, 22 N. E. 268; Brown v. McRee (1874), 57 N. Y. 684; Douthitt v. State
Nat. Bank (1914), 42 Okla. 676, 142 Pac. 1009; Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Hafner (1897),
6 Pa. Super. 48; McCormick v. Stoneheart (1917), (Tex. Civ. App.), 195 S. W.
883, 885.
3 (1897), 102 Iowa 13, 70 N. W. 732.
'(1894), 120 Mo. 349, 25 S. W. 172.5 Young v. Linn Motor Co. (1932), (Tex. Civ. App.) 53 S. W. (2nd) 799.
6 HarTis v. Dozier (1897), 72 Ill. App. 542; Deere v. Weir-Shugart Co. (1894),
91 Iowa 422, 59 N. W. 255; Japeles Confectionery Co. v. Brown (1906), 147 Ala.
593, 41 So. 626; Costa v. Whitehead (1868), 20 La. Ann. 341; Huston v. De Zeng
(1898), 78 Mo. App. 522.
7Greenwald v. Kappes (1869), 31 Ind. 216; Deere v. Weir-Shugart Co. (1894),
91 Iowa 422, 59 N. W. 255; Canal-Villere Realty Co. v. S. Grumble Realty Co.
(1849), 1 Ia. Ann. 123.
8 (1923), 81 Pa. Super. 251.
*Allen v. Cass-Stauffer Co. (1891), 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 231.
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The reason for such line of authority seems to be that while it is true
that a most important use of a party wall is to give support to the build-
ing to which it is common, as by bearing the weight of floors and roof, it
is not the only use and in many cases not the chief one. Walls are not
only important to support floors and roofs, but they are necessary to
inclose buildings and make them fit for use.10  In Hilsmeyer v. Berry,'1
the court said, "Use of a party wall does not necessarily mean that it must
be used as a means to support the weight of the adjoining structure."
It might be of value to especially notice a recent Louisiana decision12
which held that a corporation constructing a building without using the
party wall for support was not liable under the Civil Code for "use" and
did not have to pay half of the value thereof. This case is differentiated
by the court from earlier cases1 3 holding that use as an inclosure renders
user liable, inasmuch as here the corporation went to great extra expense
to keep from using the wall for support, while in the other cases the
owners used the party wall voluntarily and were benefited thereby.
As a further proposition, there is some authority that under an agree-
ment or statute requiring contribution by the adjoining owner to the
builder of a wall on use by the former, the adjoining owner is liable for
a share of the cost of the wall where it is used by his lessee, if it appears
that he knew of such use at the time it was made,14 or that he is, under
the terms of the lease, entitled to. improvements made to the premises by
the lessee. 15 In touching upon this point in the principal case, the Indiana
Appellate Court relied partially on an Iowa case, Percival v. Colonial In-
surance Co.,16 in which the court held that since the duty to contribute to
the cost of a party wall became a personal liability of the first person who
uses it, where a lot is held by the lessee who first uses the wall, there is
no liability on the part of his lessor, who has made no use of it, either to
pay the one who built it or to reimburse the lessee, who alone is liable.
The Iowa court, however, explained that this rule is the outgrowth of
Iowa's peculiar statute on the subject. This statute gives either of two
adjoining landowners the right, without the consent of the other, to rest
a party wall on the other's premises, and the court says that the only
theory on which this statute can be held constitutional is that such party
wall does not constitute an incumbrance on the premises so as to impose
a liability to a grantee under the usual covenants of conveyances. Whether
such a rule as the Iowa court has formulated as to liability of the lessor
for use of a party wall by his lessee would be applicable where a similar
statute is not in effect, as in Indiana, is at least open to question.
R. S. 0.
'(Deere v. Weir-Shugart Co. (1894), 91 Iowa 422, 59 N. W. 255.
31 (1928), 132 Okla. 177, 169 Pac. 1078, 1079.
22Grand Lodge, X, P. of Louisiana v. Thomson & Bros. (1930), 12 La. App.
258, 127 So. 32.
13Costa v. Whitehead (1868), 20 La. Ann. 341; Canal-Villere Realty Co. (1849),
1 La. Ann. 123.
"Pllsbury v. Morris (1893), 54 Minn. 492, 56 N. W. 170.
"Auch v. Labouisse (1868), 20 La. Ann 553.
18 (1908), 140 Iowa 275, 115 N. W. 941.
